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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the relevance of knowledge and ignorance in the governance of 
global finance. First, it will show that the intense innovation dynamics of financial bus i-
ness are creating regulatory problems that are not only of a normative and monetary na-
ture, but also of a cognitive one. Taking the field of banking as an example, a growing 
uncertainty regarding the outcome of financial decisions becomes discernable, which not 
only results from the globalization and increasing knowledge intensity of transactions but 
also from the market actors' tendency to engage in a more active treatment of ignorance. 
Next, attention will be drawn to concepts of knowledge politics and corresponding regu-
latory strategies which have the potential to transcend not only national boundaries but 
also to enable collective learning between heterogeneous actors. On the basis of this, the 
emergence of a cognitive approach in the governance of global banking will be illus-
trated. Finally, attention will be shifted to the revised capital adequacy framework for 
global banking, commonly known as Basle II, and an analys is of the extent to which 
conditions for an effective combination of private and public expertise are being created. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the past two decades the regulation of global finance has become a prominent topic in 
political science and sociological studies. Analyses can be found not only of institutional 
and regulatory adaptations on the national, international and supranational level (e.g.  
Dale 1984; Kapstein 1996; Eichengreen 1999; Scholte 2002) but also of the increasing 
relevance of private actors (e.g. Sinclair 1994; Cutler/Haufler/Porter 1999; Strulik 2002; 
Tsingou 2003) and mixed public-private arrangements (e.g. Strulik 2000). In light of the 
continuing development of the regulatory field as well as the intensification of the debate 
on the characteristics and effects of knowledge society (e.g. Adhikari/Sales 2001; Willke 
2002), a shift of research towards the relevance of knowledge for finance and politics 
appears heuristically promising. Instructive for such a project are empirical studies in 
political science which highlight the knowledge intensity of financial business and the 
increasing importance of market actors’ expertise in managing financial risks (e.g. Porter 
1999; Sinclair 1999). Additionally, sociological systems theory provides concepts for the 
description of not only the distinctive characteristics of knowledge but also the interac-
tion of knowledge and ignorance (e.g. Luhmann 1998; Willke 2002). An understanding 
of ignorance and its progressive (re-)production by the use of knowledge seems to be 
particularly important, because political and economic decisions are ever more often con-
fronted with problems of ignorance that cannot be specified and managed by traditional 
methods. As sociological studies on science and risk (e.g. Ravetz 1987; Bonß 1995) 
demonstrate, conditions of ambiguity and unpredictability are becoming the focal point 
of modern societies risk management. 
 
An instructive example for the ambivalent consequences of the interaction of knowledge 
and ignorance in finance as well as for a reorientation of governance strategies is pro-
vided by the banking sector. Given impetus by the breakdown of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem in 1971, and accelerated by fundamental structural adjustments in the financial mar-
kets, not only has a global network of banking been brought about, but also especially 
dynamic and knowledge intensive innovations. Although innovations are beneficial for 
an economy as a whole, they inevitably create new regulatory problems. The prolifera-
tion of derivatives business in particular, along with the increasing significance of market 
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risks and so called operational risks, which include the damage caused by inadequate 
internal organizational policy and controls, human failure, fraud and malfunctions of 
electronic data processing systems, have confronted both the banks and the supervisory 
agencies with substantial challenges. More frequently, the question is not only if financial 
decisions will have undesirable effects but what those effects will be. Respective 'am-
biguous ignorance', which is gaining relevance with the globalization and knowledge 
intensity of finance, cannot be quantified on the basis of experience and with the help of 
probability calculations. 
 
With this shift to decision-making problems related to ambiguous  ignorance, traditional 
forms of regulation, which exclusively concentrate on establishing quantitative norms 
and on controlling conformity to them, are becoming inadequate. As a result, a reorienta-
tion of regulatory strategies is discernible. Since the early 1990s qualitative regulatory 
practices have been emerging, which additionally concentrate on the banks' internal re-
quirements for risk measurement, assessment and control (Strulik 2000; Power 2002). 
Particularly far reaching in this respect is the new capital adequacy framework com-
monly known as Basle II. The final version was released by the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) in June 2004 and will be implemented into national law by 
2008. An important objective of this new framework, which effectively sets the rules for 
all banks with international transactions, is to make the structures and processes of risk 
management central to banking regulation and to differentiate supervision according to 
the bank's size, risk structure and risk potential. Accordingly, the new qualitative ap-
proach requires that national supervisors interact considerably closer with banks in the 
future. Through a dialogue based ‘Supervisory Review Process (SRP)’, which is one of 
the three pillars of Basle II, they should not only evaluate the banks' own risk manage-
ment activities, but also promote and support adaptations that may lead to more efficient 
risk management systems. On the whole, the implementation of Basle II seems to be a 
reorientation of banking regulation. In light of the heterogeneity of banks, the dynamics 
of financial business and the growing uncertainty regarding the outcomes of decisions, 
supervisory authorities as well as the banks consider the exclusive use of quantitative 
capital requirements inadequate and aim to meet the growing demands of risk manage-
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ment and supervision through more learning oriented techniques and institutional ar-
rangements. 
 
Focusing on this new regulatory approach, which is described by the Basle Committee 
and other actors as a "paradigm shift" (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 2003; 
Deutsche Bundesbank 2001), this paper examines the characteristics, potentials and 
consequences of a cognitive (learning oriented) approach in the governance of global 
finance, which is mirrored in the increasing relevance of qualitative regulatory require-
ments. After considering the ambivalence of society's knowledge production and changes 
in the economic treatment of ignorance (Part 2), the paper draws attention to concepts of 
knowledge politics and corresponding regulatory strategies which have the potential to 
transcend not only national boundaries but also to enable collective learning between 
heterogeneous social systems (Part 3). On the basis of this, the emergence of a cognitive 
approach in the governance of global banking will be illustrated (Part 4). Finally, the 
paper shifts attention to the revised capital adequacy framework for global banking, com-
monly known as Basle II, and analyses to what extent conditions for an effective combi-
nation of private and public expertise are created (Part 5). 
 
 
2. Banking in the knowledge economy 
 
The implications of the knowledge intensity of financial business for global governance 
have received increasing attention in recent years (e.g. Porter 1999; Sinclair 1999; Strulik 
2002). Particularly, the emergence and risks of complex financial innovations have been 
central features of regulatory debates. Despite this recognition of the relevance of knowl-
edge in governing global finance, there has not been a systematic effort to understand the 
distinctive characteristics and ambivalent consequences of the global financial system´s 
knowledge production. Therefore, it might be instructive to analyze the current develop-
ments in the field of risk management and banking regulation with reference to recent 
conceptual studies on knowledge economy (e.g. Willke 2002). It can be observed that the 
knowledge necessary for economic transactions is no longer mainly based on experience, 
but is generated through active learning-processes. The knowledge economy is therefore 
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not to be trivially understood as simply one in which the nature of products and services 
is knowledge intensive. The point is that the knowledge economy's basic problem is to 
generate, organize and manage new knowledge. Furthermore, if one considers knowledge 
as the result of learning, it becomes evident that the operations of the knowledge econ-
omy are particularly marked by the "reflexivity of knowledge" (Giddens 1991). This 
means that the initiation and regulation of knowledge producing processes is more im-
portant than the management of existing knowledge  (Strulik 2004). Thus, innovation 
becomes a central category referring to multi-dimensional social and economic changes 
in which new technologies, organization and communication patterns, solutions to prob-
lems, etc. can play a role. 
 
The exploitation of ignorance 
 
Closely related to these theoretical conceptions about the knowledge economy are 
sociological assessments that refer to changes in the social treatment of ignorance. As 
Michael Smithson (1989) points out: 
"Not long ago, the dominant methods of coping with ignorance were to try eliminating it or 
absorbing it. The emerging frameworks now seem to have jettisoned the assumption, that ig-
norance is ultimately reducible, and the new style is 'managerial' in the sense of attempting to 
understand, tolerate, and even utilize certain kinds of ignorance" (ibid., S. viii). 
This assessment is supported by works on decision-making theory as well as sociological 
systems theory, which consider ignorance an important condition for decision-making 
(Shackle 1979, IX) and, as such, a resource for the reproduction and expansion of social 
systems (Luhmann 1998).  
 
The importance of a more active and utilitarian treatment of ignorance becomes clear in 
connection with Robert K. Merton's (1987) considerations on the relationship between 
knowledge and ignorance. Assuming that science develops by replacing ignorance with 
knowledge, Merton refers to the dynamic cognitive role played by the particular form of 
ignorance he calls "specified ignorance". Scientific processes of knowledge-production 
"repeatedly adopt the cognitively consequential practice of specifying this or that piece of 
ignorance derived from having acquired the added degree of knowledge that made it pos-
sible to identify definite portions of the still unknown. In workaday science, it is not 
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enough to confess one's ignorance; the point is to specify it. That of course, amounts to 
instituting, or finding, a new, worthy, and soluble scientific problem" (ib id., 8). What is 
important is that economic realms are also increasingly defined by a utilitarian treatment 
of ignorance. Analysts and salespeople in investment banks, for example, exploit 
uncertainty regarding the development of markets, companies and products by transform-
ing it into specific problems (e.g. market risk, credit risk). They then use these problems 
to develop tailor-made financial instruments to offer to their customers. Within such 
working contexts, ignorance appears not as a hindrance to decision-making, but as a 
source of innovation and productivity.  
 
The increasing relevance of ambiguous ignorance 
 
For an understanding of the recent challenges in risk management and regulation of 
global banking, it is not only important to emphasize that a more active treatment of ig-
norance is accompanied by increasing innovation dynamics but also, as mentioned above, 
that ambiguous ignorance is gaining significance. With ever greater frequency, the rele-
vant actors are being confronted with a kind of ignorance, which, even with the help so-
phisticated calculations, cannot be adequately managed. The banks' treatment of market 
risks and in particular operational risks provides an example of such situations. As ad-
dressed above, operationa l risks arise from the potential that inadequate information sys-
tems, operational problems, breaches in internal controls, fraud, or unforeseen catastro-
phes will result in unexpected losses. Although the banks have developed approaches to 
quantification, managing operational risks is more complex than managing traditional 
credit risks (e.g. Avery/Butler 2000). Because it is not possible to relate all of the rele-
vant risk elements to one another, conventional techniques of specifying ignorance are 
losing their problem-solving capability. According to sociological studies on science and 
risk (e.g. Ravetz 1987; Bonß 1995), ambiguous ignorance is becoming the central prob-
lem of decision-making in our contemporary period.  
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 Ignorance ' 
 ÷ø  
'normal' ignorance  'ambiguous' ignorance 
quantifiable   unquantifiable  
e.g. credit risk  e.g. operational risk 
Figure 1: 'Normal' and 'Ambiguous' Ignorance 
 
The financial economy's shift of emphasis from 'absorbing uncertainty' to 'exploiting ig-
norance' as well as the emergence of ambiguous ignorance are especially mirrored in the 
proliferation of instruments which not only serve to limit contingencies but to take prof-
itable risks. A risk management industry of entirely new dimensions was launched with 
the collapse of the system of Bretton Woods in 1971 and further influenced by the debt 
crisis in 1982. The resulting importance of the derivatives business in banking highlights 
both the financial economy's innovation dynamic as well as the relevance of ambiguous 
ignorance. In respect to the end of a "government-led international monetary system" 
(Padoa-Schioppa/Saccomanni 1994) and increasing risks associated with changes in cur-
rency, stock and interest rates, banks started developing high performance price securing 
and arbitrage instruments (e.g. options, swaps, futures) that serve to limit risks on the one 
hand and speculate with risks on the other. While the net amount of over-the-counter 
contracts stood at $ 4,449 billion in 1991, it reached $ 99,800 billion in 2001 (BIS 1995, 
2001). Even the traditional credit business has recently gone through rapid changes, as 
indicated by new credit derivatives. What all of the innovative products and strategies 
have in common is that they involve the anticipation of future developments and 
economically utilize ignorance. Crucial for our question concerning the driving forces of 
more cognitive approaches to risk management and regulation is that the trend toward a 
futurization, or social- theoretically speaking, a "colonialization of future" (Giddens 
1991), is accompanied by a significant increase in the dynamics and knowledge  intensity 
of financial business. As a result, the complexity of financial innovations "has been run-
ning ahead not only of the ability of regulators to follow (much less to control a priori) 
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but also of the ability of many firms and financial firms to understand" (Cerny 
1994, 331). 
 
On the basis of this diagnosis it becomes clear that the financial system´s knowledge in-
tensity and innovation dynamic creates new regulatory problems, not only of a normative 
and monetary nature, but also of a cognitive one (Eichengreen 1999, 44). The cognitive 
problems that banks and supervisory agencies face can be traced back to four main fac-
tors: 
 
(1) The extraterritorialisation of financial transactions: Tailor-made financial innova-
tions as well as information technologies enable complex investment and arbitration 
strategies, which network markets once fragmented. Central problems for banks are the 
elaboration, integration and assessment of globally dispersed data (e.g. business results, 
risk analysis) as well as making use of such data in decision-making. At the same time, 
the supervisors are confronted with the fact that the consequences of the collapse of mar-
kets or organizations may transcend spatial and sectoral boundaries.  
 
(2) The asymmetry between private and public knowledge: The acceleration of knowl-
edge production in financial markets has resulted in a forced asymmetry between private 
and public knowledge. Increasingly, regulatory institutions are less prepared to confront 
private actors with sufficient external knowledge. While this is related to a well-known 
problem of regulation, the special innovation dynamics and the central position of banks 
within the economy make it more prominent. Public actors are thereby confronted with 
the task of generating suitably wide-ranging supervisory knowledge.  
 
(3) The emergence of unquantifiable risks: The innovation dynamics of finance are ac-
companied by an increasing relevance of market and operational risks, which are either 
very difficult to quantify or cannot be quantified at all. Any attempt at institutional risk 
management and supervision based on traditional 'quantitative' approaches alone is no 
longer sufficient. Financial organizations are thus faced with the need to create comple-
mentary 'qualitative' risk management mechanisms, on the basis of which it will be pos-
sible to internally observe and deal with the problems of locating and forecasting the 
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consequences of decisions. This results in the analogous need to develop supervisory 
forms that support and monitor organizations in implementing and applying such mecha-
nisms. 
 
(4) The regulatory dialectic: Political strategies of regulation are always confronted with 
the problem of being countered by the 'regulated' (Kane 1981). Corresponding dynamics 
are accelerated by an increasing knowledge intensity of the regulatory field. Looking at 
the banking sector, it is apparent that political measures aimed at a higher degree of 
safety simultaneously stimulate the banks to develop economically motivated divergence 
while creating new insecurities. For example, the banks have answered the regulatory 
demands for improvements in equity (in keeping with the Basle Accords from 1988) with 
an increase in non-balance sheet business (in particular innovations in derivatives) which 
does not have an effect on the supervisor’s equity demands. Consequently, a more inten-
sive dialogue between banks and supervisory authorities is required. 
 
The points listed here illustrate that the knowledge intensity of global banking is accom-
panied by an increase in ignorance about the development of markets, businesses and 
products. Although decision-making in the face of uncertainty is a 'normal' procedure for 
banks, constellations of ambiguous ignorance that cannot be managed by traditional 
methods of risk management are becoming more relevant. How can the impact of finan-
cial crises such as those in Asia and Russia be predicted and quantified? How can the risk 
of a complete breakdown of an electronic data processing system or fraudulent activity 
such as in the case of the British Barings Bank be measured and insured against? Because 
the gap between present decisions and future effects is becoming increasingly difficult to 
bridge with experience and probability calculations, both the banks and the institutions of 
banking supervision are facing the task of developing additional forms of (self-)regu-
lation. In light of the risks as well as the social benefits of a highly innovative financial 
business, mechanisms and institutional arrangements for the realization and support of 
innovation processes appear necessary. Thus, from a broadened (self- )regulatory perspec-
tive it is no longer solely about achieving stability or correcting market failures but also 
about promoting mixed public-private learning processes with regard to the risks of fi-
nancial innovations. 
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3. Knowledge politics 
 
Recent debates on the regulation of the ever more innovative financial business illustrate 
the limits of traditional forms of politics. The questions if and how political actors can 
adapt to an effective treatment of knowledge-driven problems are increasingly being 
dealt with in theory as well as in practice. The first concepts, although not under the 
name of knowledge politics, can be traced several decades back. Above all, the works of 
Karl W. Deutsch (1963), Harold L. Wilensky (1967) and Donald M. Michael (1973) have 
focused on the ways in which knowledge plays a crucial role in governing. In the broad-
est sense, the solutions they suggest are directed toward the initiation of learning proc-
esses within the political system as well as toward the creation of the institutional cond i-
tions for intelligent interplay of political and economic actors. Whereas the debates in the 
1960s and 70s were directed toward the national level, a new perspective was taken in 
the 1980s and 90s. In the ir research on international regimes Ernst B. Haas and Peter M. 
Haas elaborated cognitive conditions for international problem solving. While Ernst B. 
Haas (1990) emphasized the importance of "consensual knowledge", that is, a generally 
accepted knowledge to guide regulatory politics, Peter M. Haas (1992) stressed the im-
portance of epistemic communities. He defines these as a "network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area". Such experts could poten-
tially come from many different scientific disciplines or backgrounds but should be able 
to refer, to a "shared set of normative and principled beliefs", "shared causal beliefs", 
"notions of validity" and "a common policy enterprise" (ibid., 3). 
 
While these regime theoretical approaches focus on consensual and objective aspects of 
knowledge, current sociological work on knowledge politics highlights the fragmentation 
of societal knowledge production and addresses the relevance of a combination of "hete-
rogeneous knowledge" (Willke 2002; Rammert 2002). Accordingly, there is an interest in 
institutional arrangements which transcend the boundaries of nation states and function-
ally specialized societal subsystems. For Werner Rammert (2002) the limitations of the 
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governance of knowledge are mainly rooted in two paradoxical processes. "Firstly, the 
heterogeneity of the enrolled actors – scientists and managers, politicians and administra-
tors (…) – and the diversity of their perspectives cause problems of a successful concer-
tation that does not level out the creative differences between disciplines or institutional 
rationality standards, and that does not destroy the complementary competencies of func-
tionally specialized actors. Secondly, the specificity of knowledge to be an intangible 
asset and incompletely explicable set of competencies sets limits to the complete control 
(…) of knowledge" (ibid., 3). Thus, knowledge politics "should encourage the diversity 
of actors and perspectives. It should cultivate the differences in and between communi-
ties of practice. It should enable the crisscrossing between different disciplines of knowl-
edge. And it should keep on spaces and places where collective learning between hetero-
geneous actors can take place. A policy of quantitative knowledge growth should be 
complemented by a qualitative policy of knowledge diversity" (ibid., 14). 
 
In order to put such 'boundary-spanning' arrangements in more concrete terms, it is in-
structive to refer to the concept of “collective intelligence” (Willke, 2002, 174). This 
concept marks an emerging characteristic of social systems, which is not founded on the 
mere aggregation of individual intelligence, but on systemic intelligence as an emergent 
property of social systems that combine distributed intelligence. Collective intelligence 
focuses on the structures, processes and systems of rules that encourage (or hinder) col-
lective learning processes. From the perspective of the theory of self- referential systems 
(e.g. Willke 1986, 1990; Luhmann 1995) it becomes clear that governments can initiate 
and promote collective intelligence by using a political strategy which is based on con-
textual interventions instead of direct, decree-type regulations. Contextual interventions 
consist of two complementary parts: a reflexive, decentralized framing of contexts which 
may serve as common source of orientation for the problem-relevant social systems 
(interactions, organizations, functionally specialized societal subsystems); and self-
guidance of these systems within the limits of their autonomy. A "decentral framing of 
contexts" (Willke 1990) means that a minimum of common 'world view' among social 
systems seems indispensable for managing collective problems. The aspect of self-
guidance is important because only the systems themselves can implement changes in 
their basic operating procedures. If they are implanted from outside by directive 
measures, they provoke resistance, circumvention or even the collapse of the systems 
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voke resistance, circumvention or even the collapse of the systems autonomy. The "regu-
latory dialectic" (Kane 1981) exactly illustrates the problems of hierarchical intervention 
and makes sense of the fact that changes can only be realized as self- implemented 
changes and that interventions  should therefore initiate or promote processes of self-
transformation of the target systems (Willke 1990, 251). Contextual intervention by the 
state can, however, operate according to a legal approach which respects the autonomy of 
social systems and makes use of their specific problem-solving abilities. Instead of di-
recting administrative action through purposive programs and goal-directed forms of 
intervention, the state develops "relational programs" (Willke 1986), which serve to in-
volve relevant social systems in the process of formulating programs, reaching a deci-
sion, and implementation. Such relational programs are intelligent because they focus on 
the aspect of self-guidance, use the differences between various expert cultures beyond 
system boundaries and make way for reciprocal learning processes for the treatment of 
mutually created societal problems. 
 
In the case of banking regulation it becomes evident from this perspective that, on the 
one hand, a hierarchical form of banking regulation operating with strict and detailed 
quantitative requirements is inadequate. On the other hand, although the banks have high 
innovation and problem-solving potential, they are obviously unable to provide the ex-
pectation-certainty necessary for successful self-coordination. Therefore, neither hierar-
chy nor market alone are able to produce a sufficient form of governance. It is however 
thinkable that this problematic situation is leading to the development of institutional 
arrangements that make use of the advantages of both governance-mechanisms and avoid 
the disadvantages thereof. A 'viable' internalization of each other's decision-making logic 
could animate the banks as well as the supervisory agencies to reflect on the latent func-
tions of their respective modes of operation and stimulate necessary learning-processes. 
In reference to networks, Gunther Teubner (1996) points out that the involved social sys-
tems in such 'emergent' arrangements are not only attached to their basic governance-
mechanism (market or hierarchy) but additionally institutionalize the opposing principal 
(in the sense of a 'double constitution'). What is important is that market- or hierarchy-
oriented social systems are creating a new self-description of their elementary acts and 
are linking them. A 'network operation' as a new elementary act develops through social 
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double attribution of actions: every communicative event is at the same time attributed 
both to an autonomous network actor and to the network. 
 
For the governance of global banking this means that collective learning effects might be 
observed that cannot simply be described as aggregations of separately operating learning 
processes. From the perspective of systems theory it seems possible that a mixed public-
private arrangement will evolve with operations attributed to the governance-mechanisms 
market and hierarchy as well as to new elementary acts (network operations) circularly 
linked to an emergent system. On the one hand, the supervisory agencies are in a position 
to define the learning context, even if they cannot provide an effective hierarchical coor-
dination. On the other hand, the cognitive orientation of the banks is able to supply nec-
essary innovations in the field of risk management. Although this sounds rather theoreti-
cal, there are indications that such a mixed public-private arrangement, which creates 
options for a more adaptable form of regulation, has already emerged. In what follows, I 
will illustrate the common efforts of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and 
the banking industry to develop a supervisory approach, which is not only based on a 
more intensive and dialogue-oriented interaction of supervisory agencies and banks but 
also aims to improve banks´ internal structures and processes for managing risks. 
 
 
4. The emergence of a cognitive approach in banking supervision 
 
Since the 1970s the extraterritorialisation of financial transactions has lead to the deve l-
opment of regulatory arrangements beyond the nation state as well as to adjustments in 
national regulatory policy (e.g. Dale 1984; Kapstein 1996; Strulik 2000; Lütz 2002; 
Wood 2005). Corresponding efforts primarily aimed at enabling and improving the coor-
dination of national supervisory institutions and regulations. Essential in this regard was 
the establishment of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) by the central 
bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries at the end of 1974 in the aftermath of seri-
ous disturbances in international currency and banking markets (notably the failure of 
Bankhaus Herstatt in West Germany). The Committee's first task was to consider meth-
ods of improving 'early-warning' systems to prevent the spread of banking crises. Subse-
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quently, the Committee developed modalities for international cooperation in order to 
close gaps in the supervisory net and to improve supervisory understanding and the qua l-
ity of banking supervision worldwide (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 1997). 
 
Milestones along the way to an effective international cooperation were the Basle Con-
cordats of 1975 and 1983 as well as the Basle Accord of 1988. While the Concordats 
aimed at improving coordination regarding areas of responsibility, common principles of 
supervisory activities, mechanisms of information exchange and procedures for expand-
ing the decentralized competence of supervisory agenc ies, the Basle Accord on bank 
capital adequacy specified a quantitative standard for assessing the adequacy of a bank´s 
capital in relation to the varying degrees of risk associated with the different types of 
assets that it possessed (Porter 1993, 64). For the question at hand it is important to note, 
that the 'quantitative approach' manifested in the Basle Accord of 1988 already proved to 
be insufficient by the early 1990s. Although the accord constituted the foundation of an 
international consensus on banking regulation, the elaborated framework was not able to 
keep pace with the highly dynamic banking business. Above all, the growth of innovative 
derivatives business required a form of regulation that went beyond the quantitative and 
standardized treatment of risk. As Thomas M. Hoenig (1996) points out: 
‘The complexity of the new activities and instruments also makes traditional safety and 
soundness regulation more difficult by making traditional capital regulation less meaningful. 
Capital is harder to measure because it is increasingly difficult to assess the value of many of 
the new assets that are not regularly traded, such us over-the-counter derivatives and struc-
tured notes. Moreover, balance sheet information that is reported at, say quarterly intervals is 
less useful because it is only a snapshot of a portfolio whose value can change dramatically 
within a day. Also, the pure lack of information about many off-balance sheet activities makes 
it more difficult to assess capital adequacy.’(ibid., 9) 
For the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision as well as for the banking industry and 
private organizations such as the Group of Thirty (G30) and the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF) it therefore appeared necessary not only to focus on quantitative norms, but 
also to develop further measures which concentrated on the support and control of the 
internal risk management of banks. This became even more important as the quality of 
the internal risk management  of banks increasingly became a deciding competitive factor 
as a result of increasing market volatility and new possibilities of risk management 
through derivative instruments. 
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Corresponding initiatives started in the early 1990s and have led to a reorientation in the  
field of banking regulation. Although the aspect of coordination of national supervisory 
institutions and regulations is still of great importance, the attention is shifting to the in-
teraction between supervisory agencies and banks as well as to banks´ internal risk man-
agement. Traditional command and control models are being replaced by attempts to 
promote the self-regulating competence of the banks (Power 2002). Banking supervision 
is no longer exclusively concentrated on the establishment and development of standard-
ized norms (input) and on controlling conformity to them (output), but also on the sup-
port and control of structural and procedural conditions for internal risk management of 
the banks. In doing so, supervisory law is being coupled with a deve lopment that is char-
acterized by the fact that the internal quality controls of banks are increasingly aimed 
toward process optimization. Consequently, this reorientation of supervision appears to 
be particularly appealing to the economic self- interest of the banks. The development of 
a cognitive supervisory approach is mirrored by the elaboration of qualitative require-
ments for banks (e.g. adequate systems for assessing, monitoring and reporting risk ex-
posures; independent internal control review; responsibility of bank management) and a 
stronger consideration of on-site examinations by national supervisory agencies.  
 
An important first step in the direction of a more qualitative form of banking regulation 
consisted of the "Risk management Guidelines for Derivatives" published by the Basle 
Committee in July 1994. With this, the national supervisory agencies were given a basis 
for testing their own methods and procedures for evaluating the banks' risk management 
of derivative product business. This was based on the assumption that the effective risk 
management of all market participants is of substantial importance for the promotion of 
the stability of the financial system as a whole and therefore for the prevention of a sys-
tem crisis. The Committee primarily concentrated on determining the required criteria for 
the banks' internal risk management. For example, the guidelines responded to the prob-
lem of an often inadequate separation of front- and back-office by requiring a strict dif-
ferentiation of sales, administration and internal control functions. In addition, an empha-
sis was placed on independent risk controlling. Last but not least, it was made clear to the 
banks that their business managers must have a sufficient understanding of derivatives 
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business and that they must be adequately provided with the information necessary for 
decision-making. For example, the top management should be informed about the bank's 
risk options at least once per day. The guidelines were generally aimed at developing a 
greater sensitivity among the banks and supervisory agencies regarding their weak points 
in managing derivative products.  
 
In January 1996 developments towards a more qualitative form of banking regulation 
were driven forward by an addition to the 1988 Basle Accord. The rigid system of 
standardized factors for calculating banks´ capital requirements was supplemented with a 
procedure that could be used by the banks for internal risk management and was accepted 
as an instrument for external control by the supervisory agencies. This linking of internal 
and external control was manifest in the approval of bank internal models for measuring 
market risks. The Committee recommended that in the future the national supervisory 
agencies should allow the use of measurement procedures tailored to the ind ividual risk 
situation of the bank rather than require that a particular 'standardized' measurement pro-
cedure be used (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 1996). In order to improve the 
necessary self-regulatory skills of the banks, the Basle Committee made the approval of 
internal models contingent on meeting certain qualitative and quantitative minimum re-
quirements. While the quantitative requirements were mainly meant to prevent the banks 
from underestimating their risks, the qualitative requirements were aimed toward provid-
ing sufficient organizational structures and processes for the treatment of the internal 
models (Table 1). 
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1. The bank should have an independent risk control unit that is responsible for the design and implemen-
tation of the bank´s risk management system. 
2. The unit should conduct a regular Back-testing programme. 
3. Board of directors and senior management should be actively involved in the risk control process and 
must regard risk control as an essential aspect of the business to which significant resources need to be 
devoted. 
4. The bank´s internal risk measurement model must be closely integrated into the day-to-day risk man-
agement process of the bank. 
5. The risk measurement system should be used in conjunction with internal trading and exposure limits. 
6. A routine and rigorous programme of stress testing should be in place as a supplement to the risk analy-
sis based on the day-to-day output of the bank´s risk measurement model. 
7. Banks should have a routine in place for ensuring compliance with a document set of internal policies, 
controls and procedures concerning the operation of the risk measurement system. The bank´s risk 
measurement system must be well documented. 
8. An independent review of the risk measurement system should be carried out regularly in the bank´s 
own auditing process. 
Source: Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1996, 38ff.). 
Table 1: Qualitative standards for the use of internal models to measure market risks 
 
The formulation of qualitative requirements for the risk management of banks suggests a 
more intelligent supervisory strategy. The pressure caused by the existing problems led to 
initiatives which more strongly concentrated on developing the risk- learning capacities of 
banks. On the basis of the above mentioned theoretical considerations it can be observed 
that a supervisory model emerged, which works with "contextual interventions" (Willke 
1990) and the formulation of minimum requirements instead of direct, decree-type regu-
lations. The changes in both supervision and risk management not only created "market-
friendly regulation" (Padoa-Schioppa 1997) but a learning-oriented mixed public-private 
arrangement.  
 
The reorientation of the Basle Committee was driven forward by the fact that for both the 
members of the Committee and the national negotiating system (usually the interplay of 
associations, supervisory agencies and legislature) the rapid changes in banking were 
accompanied by an erosion of the traditional basis for negotiation. Expectation certainty 
could no longer be produced through agreements between negotiating partners, as nego-
tiated solutions require an awareness of preferences. In a situation in which risk could 
only be grouped, weighed and insured with capital to a very limited extent, it was diffi-
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cult for the negotiation partners to even define their desired solutions (Lütz 1998, 20). 
For which capital requirements should one stand when they can significantly change in a 
very short time? Risk management therefore became a problem of ambiguous ignorance. 
To the extent that the problem-solving functions of experience and predictability eroded, 
new ways had to be found to adequately manage the dynamic and complex risks of 
global banking. As a result, a supervisory strategy emerged, which accepted that no reli-
able standardized measure for the assessment of risk could be found. The Basle Commit-
tee recognized that a simple adaptation of the existing model could not sufficiently keep 
up with the rapidly changing environment. An extensive modification of the capital ade-
quacy framework was needed to achieve adaptable banking supervision. 
 
 
5. Basle  II and the Supervisory Review Process (SRP): A learning-oriented mixed 
public-private arrangement? 
 
With the revised capital adequacy framework commonly known as Basle II, which was 
published by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision in June 2004, qualitative su-
pervision has gained even greater importance. In light of structural changes in credit 
business, which are especially manifest in the proliferation of credit derivatives and so-
phisticated risk management systems, the Committee intends to effectively further de-
velop the 1988 Basle Accord. 
“The basic aim is to gear banks’ capital requirements more closely than in the past to the ac-
tual economic risk which they face, while also taking account of recent innovations in the fi-
nancial markets as well as in institutions’ risk management strategies. For calculating the capi-
tal ratio, the new Accord envisages a series of simple (‘foundation’) and more sophisticated 
(‘advanced’) approaches to measuring credit risk and operational risk. It lays down a flexible 
framework within which a bank, subject to a supervisory review process, may apply an ap-
proach that best suits its complexity and risk profile. Moreover, the new Accord specifically 
rewards banks for measuring risk more stringently and more precisely. (...) The Basle Com-
mittee therefore seeks to ensure that banks' own (internal) risk management systems are im-
proved further and that they are reviewed by the appropriate supervisory agencies. This is a 
new prudential element in Germany and in many other countries, where up to now prudential 
supervision has mainly taken the form of analyzing the returns and reports submitted by banks 
and the audit reports of external auditors, and it represents a paradigm shift towards a more 
qualitative prudential regime. In addition, banks are to be subject to more comprehensive dis-
closure requirements in order to use the disciplining forces of the markets as a complement to 
the regulatory requirements” (Basle Committee 2003). 
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In sum, the Committee's objective is not only to strengthen the soundness and stability of 
global finance but also to facilitate a market-oriented and innovation sensitive form of 
regulation. As a more forward-looking approach, Basle II should have the capacity to 
evolve with time. From the Committee's standpoint "(t)his evo lution is necessary to en-
sure that the framework keeps pace with market developments and advances in risk man-
agement practices" (Basle Committee 2004, 3). To achieve both – stability and innova-
tion – Basle II is based on a greater use of assessments of risk, provided by banks´ inter-
nal systems as inputs to capital calculation, as well as a detailed set of quantitative and 
qualitative minimum requirements designed to ensure the integrity of these internal risk 
assessments (ibid.). 
 
This combination of the governance mechanisms market and hierarchy, are to be realized 
by the so called "three pillars (minimum capital requirements, supervisory review, and 
market discipline) approach" (ibid., 1). Of particular interest for the question at hand is 
the so called „Supervisory Review Process (SRP)“, which is meant to provide a new 
qualitative foundation for the interaction of banks and supervisory agencies. In the future, 
banks are to be regularly contacted by their responsible local supervisory agencies for an 
on-site, dialogue-based evaluations of their ability to adequately identify, measure, man-
age and control their risks. In this regard, it is not the Committee's intention to dictate the 
form or operational details of the banks´ risk management policies and practices. Instead, 
the aim is to stimulate and evaluate learning-processes in relevant organizational areas. 
From the perspective of the Committee, a greater orientation toward the risk management 
of the banking industry appears to be most suitable for keeping pace with a highly inno-
vative financial business. It is expected that the tying of supervisory practices to private 
expertise will create opportunities for the expansion of public-private learning. On the 
one hand, the Supervisory Review Process provides an impulse for improving the skills 
of the supervisory agencies. On the other hand, the closer interaction with supervisors 
might also lead to more adequate adaptations on the side of the banks. For example, the 
planned evaluation of the banks' internal structures and processes for determining the 
capital requirements could promote the explication of implicit knowledge about risk 
management and thereby the revision of established goals and procedures. 
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It is important to note, that in respect to the banks' internal procedures for the assessment 
of capital adequacy, it is not simply about learning or the promotion of 'best-practices' 
(Power 2002). The cognitive interaction of banking supervision and banks is also sup-
ported by conditions for intervention. Should the supervisors evaluate the ability of the 
banks to assess and control capital requirements as inadequate, principles 3 and 4 con-
cerning the Supervisory Review Process provide various measures which can be taken. 
For example, a bank can be required to prepare and implement a satisfactory capital ade-
quacy restoration plan. In especially difficult cases, the supervisors can even demand that 
the bank raise additional capital immediately. Furthermore, it is up to the discretion of 
the responsible national agencies to apply the measures which they consider best suited 
to the given situation of the bank and its business environment (Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2004, 164). 
 
The Basle recommendations are to be incorporated into national law by the beginning of 
2007. Therefore, no empirical studies on their formation and effects are available yet. On 
the basis of experience with on-site inspections, which were first introduced in Germany 
in 1999 by the sixth amendment to the "Gesetz über das Kreditwesen" (KWG) and also 
initiated by the Basle Committee, there is at least an indication that the conditions for 
generally higher performing institutional arrangements are given (Strulik 2000). From the 
perspective of the actors involved, a "mutual learning process" has been set in motion 
that reacts to the increasing dynamic and intransparency of global financial business. 
Although the interactions taking place in the context of the on-site inspections have been 
anything but smooth, they are greeted by both the supervisory agencies and the banks. 
While supervisors are more than ever before in a position to gain insight into banks´ in-
ternal conditions for adequate risk management and to learn different procedures for 
measuring risk, banks have the advantage that they can demonstrate the quality and ef-
fectiveness of their individual ('tailor made') risk management systems. Furthermore, 
supervisors are not only capable of sanctioning bad practices but also of reducing poten-
tial uncertainties such as interpretation problems in regard to the qualitative minimum 
requirements and of setting priorities for further improvements. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The contours of the developments in the field of banking regulation which have been 
presented here, indicate that the knowledge driven co-evolution of finance and politics 
has not only led to a globally-oriented but also to a cognitive (learning-oriented) form of 
supervision. An ongoing shift from a conventional market-correcting to an innovation-
enabling mode of banking supervision can be observed, which not only demonstrates the 
tendency toward a more active but also the need for a competent treatment of ambiguous 
ignorance. During the 1990s the interaction of the Basle Committee for Banking Super-
vision and the banking industry resulted in a qualitative supervisory approach that fo-
cused on the internal structures and processes of the banks and rewarded learning ad-
vancements in risk management. Accordingly, supervision on the national level is not 
only concerned with the promotion of the banks' internal learning processes and 'best 
practices' but with the evaluation of the banks' internal risk assessments and strategies as 
well as the administering of sanctions in cases in which these do not meet the require-
ments of the supervisor. It is important to note, that Basle II and especially the Supervi-
sory Review Process bring the national supervisory agencies into a position to expand  
their own expertise in respect to the assessment of innovative risk management proce-
dures. 
 
On both the level of supranational rule building and of national supervision, institutional 
arrangements and mechanisms appear to be emerging which do not simply mediate be-
tween the primarily hierarchical control modus of banking supervision and the primarily 
market oriented innovative modus of the banks but perform beyond both of these govern-
ance mechanisms. At this point in time, it is an open empirical question to what extent 
the existing potential will be put into practice. It can already be seen, however, that the 
implementation of the Supervisory Review Process will confront the national supervisors 
with considerable demands. The stronger orientation of the new framework toward the 
self-regulation skills of the banks should not be understood as lean government or a "neo-
liberal model of regulation" (Power 2002). On the contrary, effective qualitative supervi-
sion demands increased state efforts toward improving its supervisory competencies. An 
intense treatment of the banks' management of risk and capital requirements requires 
 23 
substantially more sophisticated expert and process knowledge from the supervisors. 
More intensively than ever before, the supervisors need to have an understanding of the 
organizational and management structures, the business strategies and processes, the di-
verse and complex financial products, and the complicated risk and management proce-
dures of the banks. Therefore, in Germany for example, the two supervisory bodies Bun-
desbank and Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) started adjusting 
their examiner capacities in 2002. In order to prepare the new staff for their challenging 
job, a joint training program was launched in which about 200 employees participated 
from July 2002 to July 2004. The program consisted of on the job training periods as 
well as seminars, to which many experts from the German banking industry contributed. 
More than half of the 150 trainers came from outside of banking supervision" (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 2005, 15). 
 
Although a detailed analysis of the conditions, functions and effects of the revised capital 
adequacy framework remains to be done, the closeness of the new regulations to the 
conceptual considerations on knowledge politics, which are outlined above, can be rec-
ognized. The implementation of the Supervisory Review Process creates the conditions 
for a closer interaction of the relevant private and public actors and therewith options for 
a learning oriented combination of heterogeneous rationalities, governance-mechanisms 
and knowledge resources. In general, the orientation of banking regulation toward a con-
textual intervention (Willke 1990) and a stronger consideration of qualitative supervisory 
elements can be understood as an indicator that, in light of globalization and increasing 
knowledge intensity of global finance, processes of organizational and inter-organizatio-
nal learning regarding the management of financial risks are becoming important re-
sources in regulatory politics.  
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